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" Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can 
be resolved by the application of law decided in a 
fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum.n 1 
Section 34 of the Constitution recognises for the second 
time2 in South Africa's fledgling constitutional development that 
a right of access to the courts exists whenever there is a 
dispute which can be legally resolved. The inclusion of this 
right elevates to the level of a constitutional entitlement (and 
no doubt also supplements) the principle which has been taken as 
almost axiomatic in South Africa's common law that one whose 
legal rights have been infringed and/or threatened is entitled 
to redress through the courts, which courts will adjudicate upon 
his or her claim and, if successful, the legal process will be 
available to him or her to enforce their rights. 
It would seem that section 34 has the potential to be· 
versatile and multi-functional. On the one hand it would seem to 
reflect a self-contained independent right on which litigants may 
validly seek to rely when it is alleged that their access to 
court.has been impeded. 3 On the other hand the provisions of 
section 34 can, and it is submitted ought to, have a symbiotic 
relationship with certain of the other rights contained in 




S 34 (hereinafter referred to as ~section 34") of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(Act 108 of 1996) (the 1996 Constitution) 
Section 34's predecessor was section 22 of the 1993 
Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) (the 1993 Constitution) 
See generally Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1996 (12) 























protection and benefit of the law, 4 the right to property, 5 the 
right .against self-incrimination, 6 the right of access to 
information, 7 the right to just administrative action, 8 and the 
right to privacy. 9 In many cases where section 34 is relied upon 
by one party in a civil action against another party, the rights 
to property and to equal protection and benefit of the law will, 
it is submitted, also play particularly important complementary 
roles in the adjudicatory process. The right to property will 
often play a role because most civil claims are, about the 
enforcement of patrimonial rights, while the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law will often play a role because 
all litigants are (at least theoretically) entitled to be treated 
on an equal footing by the court. 10 The right against self-
incrimination may come into direct conflict with the right of 
access to court of citizen Yin circumstances where, for example, 
the latter seeks enforcement of an Anton Pillar Order. 11 The 















Indeed the right of equality before the law is itself 
accessory to other substantive rights too. See South 
African Law Commission Final Report on Group and Human 
Rights (Project 58) @ 17 
See generally Dabelstein and others v Hildebrandt and 
others 1996 (3) .SA 42 (C) where Farlam J dismissed art 
argument that the granting of an Anton Piller order 
infringed a number of constitutional rights 
including the right to human dignity, the right to 
privacy, the right against self-incrimination and not 
to be a compelable witness against oneself, and the 























right of access to court in the discovery procedure in civil 
proceedings. The right to just administrative action is 
supplemented and strengthened by the court's powers of review and 
resistance to ouster clauses, while the right to the privacy of 
citizen X might come into conflict with the right of access to 
court of citizen Y when the latter seeks to lead evidence which 
may have been obtained through the infringement of the farmer's 
rights to privacy. 
This dissertation will seek to examine the right of access 
to court in civil litigation in closer detail. It will briefly 
examine the history and development of the right and consider its 
counterparts in certain foreign constitutional instruments. 
Certain specific aspects of the application of the right will be 
examined (or touched upon, as the case may be) namely its effect 
(if any) upon the absence of a general right of appeal, the right 
(if any) to legal representation, the effect\ of the right of 
access to court (if any) upon certain court rules and 
procedures, 12 and its effect ( if any) upon extinctive 
prescription. In so doing it will examine instances of the 
right's application by the courts (both foreign and local) in 
order to understand, in so far as it is possible to do so, the 
extent of its meaning and content. 
1. History and Development of the Right of Access to court 
12 
"Legal remedies can be pursued only by recourse to 
courts of law, whose essential function is to enable 
people to enforce their rights and obtain their 
remedies, and also to defend themselves against the 
claims of others, in a peaceable manner and without 























resorting to physical violence." 13 
A civil suit has traditionally been seen as a conflict 
between private parties in which the only role of the State is 
to provide the machinery for the adjudication of the dispute. 14 
Having been derived from the English adversarial model, the role 
of the South African judge in a civil suit is a passive one, 
leaving the active role to the parties themselves. In keeping 
with Anglo-American common law-oriented systems, party control 
rules supreme in civil litigation. 15 Party control of civil 
litigation permeates all three phases of civil procedure -
pleadings, pre-trial and trial. 16 Within the framework of this 
traditional approach to civil litigation, it appears that our 
courts have (with the possible exeception of certain Appellate 
Division decisions in the 1980's) 17 been somewhat consistent in 
their application of the common law maxims ubi ius ibi remedium 
and audi al te.ram part em to ensure that a plaintiff 18 is entitled 
to pursue his or her remedy through the courts and for a 
defendant19 to be given the opportunity to tell his or her 







Herbstein and van Winsen, The Civil Practice of the 
supreme Court of South Africa <now the High courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal), (4th edition), at page 
2 
W le R De Vos, "The Impact of the New Constitution 
upon Civil Procedural Lawr, in Stell L R (1995) @ 37 
Idem at page 38 
Loe cit 
See, for example Staatspresident v United Democratic 
Front 1988 4 SA 830 (A) 
Or applicant, appellant or petitioner 
Or respondent 


















In Minister of the Interior and another v Harris and 
others21 Centlivres CJ, quoting from Holt CJ in Ashby v Whit~ 
and from Dixon v Harrison, 23 respectively, said the following : ' 
" If a plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity 
have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a 
remedy, if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment 
of it, and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a 
right without a remedy; for want of right and want of 
remedy are reciprocal." 
and 
" ... that a man hath a right to a thing for which the 
law gives him no remedy; which is in truth as great an 
absurdity, as to say, the having of a right, in law, 
and having no right, are in effect the same." 
Before the advent of the 1993 Constitution it was invariably 
accepted that when one had a substantive right at common law one 
was entitled to seek the enforcement of that right through the 
courts. It would accordingly seem that the courts formulated 
their rules in such a way as to attempt to ensure fairness and, 
insofar as it was within their power to do so, to provide an 
"equality of weapons". A defendant is, for example, entitled to 
plead to a plaintiff's claim24 (and to counterclaintf and a 











1954 ( 4) SA 769 SA 769 (A) 
1892 ER 126 @ 136 
124 ER 958@ 964 
. Eg. Uniform Rule Qf GQurt (URC) 22 made pursuant to 
the Supreme Court Act (Act 59 of 1959) 























applicant. 26 A party is entitled to have prior sight of documents 
which the other party might use in the trial against him or 
her, 27 to inspect things or medically examine persons in relation 
to any issue of relevance at the trial, prior to the trial, so 
as not to be taken by surprise. 28 At the trial each party is 
entitled to cross-examine the other party's witnesses and to 
address the court at the conclusion of the evidence. All these 
things, which are often taken for granted by the legal 
practitioner, are aspects of the common law rights of access to 
court and equality before the law, which a litigant has always 
enjoyed. There can be little doubt that our courts have long 
cherished maxims ubi ius ibi remedium and audi alteram partem -
if not in its application of human rights entrenched in a Bill 
of Rights, most certainly in the context of civil litigation 
where the extensive real and personal rights, granted by the 
common law, 29 have been adjudicated upon. 
On 27 April 1994 the 1993 Constitution came into force. 
Chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution comprised a Bill of Rights -
the first in South Africa's constitutional history. South Africa 
accordingly became a constitutional democracy with the 
Cons ti tut ion replacing Parliament as the sovereign power. In 
practical terms this development meant that any law (whether 
statutory or common law) unjustifiably inconsistent with any 





Eg. URC 6 (5) (d) 
Eg. through the discovery procedure provided in URC 35 
Eg. URC 36 
For more about the elements of the elements of the 
audi alteram partem rule see Corder, "The content of 
the audi al teram partem rule in South African 























Constitutional Court. 30 One of the new rights entrenched in the 
1993 Constitution was section 22 which effectively 
constitutionalised the common law right of access to court and 
which read as follows : 
"Every person shall have the right to have justiciable 
disputes settled by a court of law or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial forum.n 
According to Du Plessis and Corder 31 the inclusion in the Bill 
of section 22 as a subs tan ti ve right found particular favour 
among the parties negotiating the 1993 Constitution mainly, it 
would seem, because it wo_uld prevent Parliament from enacting 
laws which sought to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 32 While 
undoubtedly granting South Africans a substantial advantage over 
other countries which do not have a constitutional right of 
access to court in most civil matters per se, 33 section 22 did 
not expressly state that the hearing before the court of law or 
other independent and impartial forum had to be a fair one. This 
omission apparently led Ackermann Jin the case of Bernstein & 






A new superior court, created bys 98(1) of the 1993 
Constitution, which stands at the apex of the judicial 
heirarchy along with the Appellate Division (now the 
Supreme Court of Appeal) 
In Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of 
Rights at 13 
There can be no doubt that one of the clearest effects 
of s 22 was essentially to eliminate the ouster 
clauses of old. 
for example Canada, where, in the absence of a 
constitutional right to property, it cannot be said 
that a right of access to court exists in matters 
where proprietrary rights are at stake (see the 
discussion below relating to the Canadian approach) 























obiter remarks, to conclude that an argument could be made out 
that the framers of the Constitution "deliberately elected not 
to constituionalise the right to a fair civil trial. " 35 The 
learned justice's basis for this view was that a provision cannot 
be read into a clause in a statute if all the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that such provision was deliberately 
omitted, and that all indications were that the framers of the 
Constitution were well aware of such express provisions in other 
international human rights instruments and apparently chose not 
to include them in the 1993 Constitution. 36 Ackermann J' s 
approach has been criticised by Chaskalson et al, 37 inter alia, 
" 
because it is based on an "unduly narrow" reading of the section 
and because it applies the conventional rule of statutory 
interpretation38 relating to implied provisions to the section 
rather than the rules for the interpretation of Constitutions and 
Bills of Rights. 39 
In its report 40 of October 1994 the South African Law 
Com..~ission proposed that the Access to the Courts provision in 







"Every person shall have the right to have justiciable 
disputes settled in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal 
idem at 805C 
idem at 804F to 805D 
Constitutional Law of South Africa@ 26-6 to 26-8 
idem at 26-8 
for the difference between statutory, constitutional 
and bills of rights interpretation see idem at 11-10 
to 11-16 























established by law. " 41 (my emphasis) 
Section 34 of the 1996 Constitution, 42 which duly replaced 
section 22 of the, clearly extends the ambit of the right by 
endorsing the recommendation of the South African Law Commission 
to the extent to which the words "fair" and "public hearing" have 
now been added. There are two noticeable differences, however, 
between the wording of the Commission's recommendation (and the 
former section 22) on the one hand and section 34 on the other. 
The first is the substitution of the words "justiciable disputes" 
with the words "dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law", which is apparently in line with the new linguistic 
formulation of the section. 43 The second noticeable difference 
is that the words "court" and "tribunal" are not qualified to the 
effect 'that they must be "established by law". Though the 
sig~ificance (if any) of this second difference remains to be 
seen, it is submitted that the new section, read as a whole, 
probably envisages that the right to a hearing before an 
independent and impartial forum is no longer necessarily confined 
to proceedings before courts of law or public tribunals 44 but is 





idem at pg. 75 
Set out in the opening paragraph of this dissertation 
This particular grammatical style is not confined to 
section 34. On this note see L M Du Plessis, "The Bill 
of Rights in the working draft of the New Consitution 
: an evaluation of aspects of a constitutional text 
sui generis", Stell L R (1996) @ 4 to 6; and G 
Carpenter, "Possible amendntents to the 1996 Bill of 
Rights - what, where and why?", in Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law Journal of Southern Africa (vol 1, 
no 4) @ 5 
Which, on a reading of Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) 
SA 850 (CC) would probably have been the case if 
section 7 (1) of the 1993 Constitution was still in 
force, in which event the Right of Access to Court 
(and indeed the entire Bill of Rights) would probably 























certain domestic or private quasi-courts and arbitration 
tribunals which are not established in terms of law. 45 
Whatever the case might be with regard to the nature of the 
forum, there can be no question that any former doubt as to 
whether the Constitution entrenched the right to "fairu civil 
litigation has been removed by the express provision that, in 
addition to the forum being "independent and impartialu, the 
hearing must also be "fairu. Section 34, unlike section 35 (3) 46 
is, however, silent on what the precise meaning of "fairu is. The 
question of what constitutes a "fair" hearing before a civil 
court (or other tribunal or forum which is seized with a non-
criminal dispute) will, in my view, therefore depend heavily on 
judicial interpretation. It also goes without saying that the 
above must also hold true in respect of the general limitation 
clause47 in terms of which where a provision in a law prima 
facie infringes one's right of access to the courts, the state 
(or other party relying on the validity of such law or procedure) 
has to prove that the limitation of the right is "reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom", to avoid a declaration of 




The extent to which any fundamental right contained in 
Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution can be enforced. in 
such private tribunals as between private individuals 
will, in terms of s 8(2) thereof, of course depend on 
the nature of the right (and to the extent to which it 
is applicable) given particular circumstances of each 
case. See further Cheadle and Davis, "The Application 
of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere", 
SAJHR, (Volume 13, Part 1, 1997) 
Which sets out in extensive detail precisely which 
elements are included in an accused's right to a fair 
criminal trial 























the law or procedure concerned) the court is expressly enjoined48 
to take all relevant factors into consideration, including: (a) 
the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose; (d) less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
In determining the extent of the right of access to court 
(including the question of what constitutes a fair hearing), and 
in determining whether any prima facie infringement of section 
34 is permissible in terms of section 36(1), in a given case, the 
court must, moreover, promote the values underlying an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
must consider international law and may consider the law foreign 
jurisdictions. 49 It is the law in certain foreign jurisdictions 
(which are submitted to be "open and democratic societies") which 
is now to be considered. 
2. The Right of Access to Court, and to a fair hearing, in 
foreign jurisdictions 
A number of foreign constitutional instruments make 
provision for some right of access to court - whether in express 
terms or through the indirect application of another right (such 
as through a right to property or a right of equal protection of 
the law) . 
48 By s 36 (1) 























(a) -The United States of America 
According to Smi t 50 the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution of the ·united States of America, which guarantees 
the right to trial by jury according to the rules of the common 
law, is the only express provision relating to the conduct of 
civil litigation in a trial court. Be that as it may there can 
be little doubt that the most important provisions in the United 
States Constitution which govern a person's right of access to 
court in the context of civil litigation (albeit implicitly) are 
the Fifth Amendment51 and the Fourteenth Amendment 52 , the salient 





"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury .•. [exceptions] ... nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."; 53 and 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge any of the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
H Smit, "Constitutional Guarantees in Civil Litigation 
in the United States of America", in M Cappelletti' s 
Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil 
Litigation@ 447 
Of 1791, which applies to the federal government 
























laws. " 54 (my emphasis) 
While the Fifth Amendment would, prima facie, appear to provide 
rights predominantly in the context of criminal proceedings, the 
Fourteenth Amendment encapsulates in one paragraph all the rights 
contained in sections 34, 9(1) and 25(1) of South Africa's 1996 
Cons ti tut ion. 55 For the purposes of the discussion under this 
sub-heading, the right of access to court will be referred to as 
the right to "due process" and the right of equal protection of 
and be~efit of the law as the right to "equality". 
It has been held in a number of old American cases that the 
due process clause provides'a guarantee to each litigant of a 
"fair and adequate opportunity to be heard. " 56 A variety of 
situations have been considered by the United States Supreme 
Court in which the right to due process in the context of civil 
litigation featured prominently. In Sniadach v Family Finance 
Corporation57 a provision in a state's law which permitted the 
freezing of one half of the wages of a Defendant, before judgment 
upon a mere service of a summons, was held to violate due 
process. The reasons for the violation included the fact that the 
Defendant was a resident of the state concerned and that he was, 
therefore, in any event subject to the adjudicatory authority of 







Namely the rights of access to court, equal protection 
of and benefit of the law, and to property, 
respectively. 
See Smit ( supra) @ 451 and the cases cited infra 
footnote 79 
395 US 337, 89 S Ct 1820, 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969) - see 
further Smit@ 451 
397 US 254, 90 S Ct 1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970) - see 























which concerned the right to be heard in the context of 
administrative proceedings where an applicant's welfare payments 
had been terminated, it was held that due process required that 
the applicant was entitled to the following ( 1) timely and 
adequate notice, 59 (2) the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him, (3) the right of oral presentation, (4) 
the right to retain an attorney, (5) reasons (founded upon legal 
rules and evidence) for the decision, and ( 6) an impartial 
decision-maker. Smit submits60 that it is "most probable" that at 
least most of above six requirements in Goldberg v Kelly would 




The manner in which service of process takes place 
often raises questions about whether the defendant had 
adequate and proper notice of the pending proceedings 
and whether there was, accordingly, due process. See 
Smit. (supra) @ 449 and the cases cited infra. It would 
appear that in the United States, as in South Africa, 
personal service is the most preferable (and 
constitutionally the most desirable) means of giving 
notice to a defendant. 
@ 452 
In civil trial proceedings before South African courts 
of law, requirements (1), (2), (3) and (6) are 
submitted to be inextricably bound up in the notion of 
what constitutes a fair trial before a judicial 
tribunal in terms of the common law principle of audi 
alteram partem. See, for example, Corder "Th.e content 
of the audi alteram partem rule", (1980) 42 THRHR 156 
@ 158. Requirement (5) is expressly recqgnised in 
common law maxim nemo iudex in sua causa - as 
understood in Manning v council of Review 1989 4 SA 
866 (C), while the rules of the inferior courts (with 
the exception of the small claims court) and of the 
superior courts have expressly recognised requirement 























(b) The European Community 
The European Convention on Human Rights, 62 sets out a number 
of fundamental human rights which are monitored by the European 
Commission and Court, the duties of which include attempting to 
ensure tha:t the provisions of the Convention are not breached by 
member states. One of the provisions in the Convention is Article 
6(1) which, inter alia, reads as follows 
"In the determination of his civil. rights and obl.igations 
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law ... " 
(my emphasis) 
It is self-evident that there are marked similarities 
between the wording of the opening sentence of article 6(1) and 
section 34 of South Africa's Constitution. Both, for example, 
speak of a "fair" and "public" hearing before an "independent and 
impartial tribunal." As is the case in South Africa's 
Constitution, the rights of an accused in criminal proceedings 
are, ex facie the Convention, more extensive than those of a 
party to civil litigation and are expressly and separately 
enumerated63 An important difference between article 6 ( 1) and 
section 34 is the "limitation" of the right of access (in the 
former) to "the determination of ... civil rights and obligations" 
compared with the seemingly all-embracing application of the 
right to "any dispute which can be resolved by the application 
of law'' (in the latter) . Another difference is the express 
62 
63 
Signed in Rome in November 1950, and which came into 
force in September 1953 
Compare article 6 ( 3) of the Convention with section 























injunction in article 6 ( 1) that the hearing must take place 
"within a reasonable time. " 64 
According to van Dijk and van Hoof, 65 the European Court has 
developed certain points of departure as to the meaning of 
Article 6(1). These include the important finding that not only 
does Article 6(1) provide procedural guarantees in relation to 
judicial proceedings, but it also founds a right to judicial 
procedure - or a right of access to court. This important 
conclusion was reached in the Court's seminal decision Golder v 
United Kingdom, 66 where it stated that : 
"Article 6 (1) secures to everyone the right to have 
any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations 
brought before a court or tribunal. In this way, the 
Article embodies the 'right to a court', of which the 
right of access, that is the right to institute 
proceedings before courts in civil matters, 
constitutes one aspect only. To this are added the 
guarantees laid down by Article 6(1) as regards both 
the organisation and composition of the court, and the 
conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole makes up 
the right to a fair hearing." (my emphasis) 
The exercise of the right of access to a court is not absolute 




For an extensive commentary on this l,ast-mentioned 
requirement see P van Dijk and G J H van Hoof, Theory 
and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2ed) @ 328 et sequ 
Idem@ 296 et sequ. 














community and individuals. 67 A "proportionality" test was adopted 
in regard to the limitation of article 6(1) in Ashingdane v UK, 68 
where it was stated as follows : 
" ... the limitations .. . must not restrict or reduce the 
access ... in such a way or to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a 
limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if 
it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is 
not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
achieved. 11 
According to Golder, 69 the right will, furthermore, always be 
subject to procedural and administrative conditions such as time 
limits, security for costs, office hours, use of prescribed forms 
and so on. Parliamentary immunity has also been held to be a 
justifiable limitation. 70 To qualify as a "fair hearing" the 
principle known as the "equality 
importance 71 According to Siegha¥t 
of arms" is of paramount 
the application of the 
I principle means that a party should have "a reasonable 















See R Beddard, Human Rights and Europe@ pg. 167 
7 EHRR 528@ para 57 
Supra 
See Xv Austria (3374/67) CD 29, 29 and Agee v United 
Kingdom (7729/76) DR 7, 164 
See Ofner and Hopfinger v Austria (524/69; 617/59) 
Report: 23 November 1962 and Artico v Italy 3 EHRR 1 
P Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights, @ 
§ 22.4.5, p 279. See too 434/58, xv Sweden, Yearbook 
ll (1958-1959), p 354 (370-372); xv Belgium, D & R 9 























disadvantage vis-a-vis his (or her) opponent. 11 It has furthermore 
been held that the principle of "equality of arms" means that the 
parties must, at the very least, have the same records and other 
documents which are material to the case. 73 The principle also 
entails the right of the one party to be able to oppose the 
arguments advanced by the other, 74 the right to the admission of 
relevant and reliable evidence, 75 an equal opportunity to summon 
witnesses and experts76 and the parties' right to be present in 
person. 77 This last mentioned right does not, however, mean that 
default judgment cannot be granted in any circumstances where a 
party is absent, but for it to be granted the person must have 
been summonsed by a procedure which provides sufficient 
guarantees that such person will receive notice of the 
proceedings. 78 In the event ,of a judgment by default79 any waiver 
of a right granted by the Convention must be unequivocal. 80 
With regard to the requirement that the court must be an 
"independent and impartial tribunal established by law", it has 




See van Dijk and van Hoof (supra) @ 320 and the cases 
cited infra footnote 601 
Loe cit and the cases cited infra footnote 603 
For a discussion of thie element see Macdonald et al, 
The European system for the protection of Human Rights 
@ 393 and the cases cited infra footnote 62 





Loe cit and Monnell and Morris v the United Kingdom 
(1987) 10 EHRR 205: 209 
See Macdonald et al (supra) @ 321 and Colozza v Italy 
7 EHRR 516 (1985) 
At least in criminal proceedings 























comprised exclusively of people with legal training. 81 It has 
been held that the word "independent" means two things 
independence from the Executive and independence from the 
parties. 82 According to Sieghart, 83 it is also a requirement that 
a court must give reasons for its decision84 , though it does not 
follow that the court is bound to deal with all points which a 
party considers essential to his or her case. Nonetheless, if 
on the face of a judgment it is shown that the court ignored a 
fundamental defence placed before it which, if successful, would 
have wholly or partially discharged the defendant from liability 
then this factor in itself would, according to Sieghart85 be 
enough to rebut the presumption that the hearing was a fair 
one. 86 
(c) The United Kingdom 
Although the United Kingdom is a party to the European 







xv Austria (1476/62) CD 11, 31; xv Austria (5481/72) 
CD 44, 127, Langborger v Sweden 12 EHRR 416 (1989); 
Sramek v Austria 7 EHRR 351 ( 1984); De Cubber v 
Belgium 7 EHRR 236 (1984); Piersack v Belgium 5 EHRR 
169 (1982); Hauschildt v Denmark 12 EHRR 266 (1989) 
See Sieghart at§ 22.4.5, pg 284 and the cases cited 
infra footnote 105. With regard to the requirements of 
independence and impartiality see, further, the 
discussions in Beddard at pg 169 to 170 and in 
McDonald et al at pg. 397 to 398 
Op loc cit 
This is not, necessarily, the situation in South 
Africa. See, for example, the remarks of Thring Jin 
S v Sonday and another 1994 (2) SACR 810 (C} at 821e 
Idem@ 285 
See too Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd and 
International Synthetic Rubber co Ltd v United Kingdom 























can rely upon the terms of the Convention in giving him or her 
any rights under English common law. 87 The United Kingdom has an 
unwritten constitution in terms of which Parliament, and not the 
Constitution or a Bill of Rights, is sovereign. Though, from a 
technically legal point of view, there is no formal 
constitutional guarantee of the rights of litigants in civil 
proceedings, the United Kingdom has a proud history in which the 
common law of civil procedure has been developed, and in which 
there have been a number of constitutional "landmarks" granting 
fundamental rights to British subjects. 88 Jolowicz's submission89 
that any substantial departure from the spirit of the fundamental 
provisions in these landmarks would be politically difficult if 
not impossible, cannot be faulted. There can be little doubt that 
the constitutional balance of political power in the United 
Kingdom, which has stood the test of time, and the development 
of the rules of fairness and natural justice90 by its courts over 
a number of centuries91 ably qualifies that country as an "open 
and democracic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom". If nothing else, it is submitted that its approach to 
civil litigation, developed over centuries, where the "Rule of 
Law" has been jealously guarded, will be useful and instructive 
in assisting our courts in determining whether any law or 
procedure which is prima facie an infringement of section 34 is 






See J A Jolowicz in Fundamental Guarantees of the 
Parties in Civil Litigation (supra)@ 124 
Loe cit. These "landmarks" include the Magna Carta 
(1215), the "Petition of Right" (1628), the "Bill of 
Rights" (1688) and the Act of Settlement (1700) 
Loe cit 
Which include such treasured concepts as the Rule of 
Law and Habeus Corpus 










submitted that this is particularly true given the fact that 
South Africa's system of civil procedure is based largely on the 
English model. 92 
\ 
According to Jolowicz93 the English common law, bolstered by 
its rules of court, has recognised the following as being 
elements of a right to a fair trial: the right of notice of the 
proceedings, 94 the right to notice of the opponent's case,9 5 the 
right of each party to an adequate opportunity to present his or 
her evidence96 and argument to the courf, the right to the 
proper application of the rules of evidence, 98 the right to a 
public hearing99 and the application generally of the rules of 
I justice contained in the common law maxims - nemo iudex in causa 






















See generally H Erasmus "Historical Foundations of the 
South African Law of Civil Procedure", 108 SALJ (1991) 
@ 156 et sequ 
Personal service being the most preferred means, 
alternatively substituted service, with the leave of 
the court where there have been at least two failed 
attempts at personal service and where it is likely 
that proceedings will come to the attention of the 
defendant. See idem@ 157 to 158 
Which include the pleadings summarising the respec~ive 
parties' cases and pre-trial procedures including 
discovery, which enable the parties to adequately 
prepare to meet each other's cases. See idem@ 158 to 
160 
Which would, of necessity, include the right to cross-
examine. See idem at@ 163 
Save for where the court gives judgment in favour of 
a party after having indicated that it was unncessary 
to hear argument from that party. See idem at@ 162 
See idem@ 164 to 165 
With certain exceptions. See idem@ 166 to 168 
























Section 1 (a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights101 recognised and 
declared, inter alia, the following right : 
"the right of the individual to life, security of the 
person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except by due process of 1.aw." (my 
emphasis) 
Section 2(e) of the same Bill states, inter alia, that unless it 
is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada to 
operate notwithstanding the Bill, no law of Canada shall be 
construed or applied so as to : 
"deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
for the determination of his rights and obligations." 
It is clear then that while section l(a) protects property rights 
through a "due process" clause, section 2(e) protects a person's 
right to a fair hearing when his or her rights or obligations are 
to be determined. As is clear from the language of section 2 for 
historical reasons, and though an important document, the Bill 
is from a legal point of view102 simply another Act of Parliament 
which does not constitutionally entrench the rights which it 
declares. 
In 1982, however, the Canadian Charter was enacted - which 
101 
102 
SC 1960, c 44 
See G A Watson in Fundamental Guarantees of the 























is a constitutionally entrenched document. 103 Section 7 of the 
Charter reads as follows : 
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except 1.n accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice." 
As Hogg correctly notes104 two guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
which are not "substantially replicated" in the Charter are the 
very sections l{a) and 2(e) set out above. It is Hogg's view 105 
that Seeton 7 of the Charter neither provides an entrenched 
protection of property rights nor guarantees a fair hearing where 
only "economic interests" are in question. Apparently Canadian 
courts have refused to extend the meaning of liberty "beyond 
freedom from physical restraint" to include, for example, 
"economic" liberty. 106 The Bill of Rights (which only applies to 
federal and not provincial laws) 107 still applies, however, in 
Canada to the extent to which it has not been superseded by the 
Charter. 108 Given the fact that most litigation is about 
proprietrary interests of some kind (usually money), section 7 
of the Charter does not protect parties in such cases while 
section 2(e) of the Bill does, provided the dispute is governed 








s 52(1) which provides that the Constitution is the 
"supreme law" and any law inconsistent therewith is 
invalid to the extent of such inconsistency 
P w Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3ed),@ 788 
Idem@ 788 
Idem@ 1027 


























a duty to observe the rules of ~natural justice", as do their 
British and South African counterparts, there is (at least in 
theory) no constitutional bar to an express provision in 
provincial legislation to the contrary . 110 As Watson points out111 
the rights of civil litigants in Canada are not derived, 
primarily, from the Constitution or Bill of Rights, but from the 
"body of basic principles, usually referred to as the rules of 
'natural justice,' developed by the courts as part of the common 
law." Given the unlikelihood of any drastic enactments limiting 
the rights of civil litigants in the light of Canada's political 
and constitutional history, there appears to be no valid reason 
why the common law rules developed in Canada regarding the right 
of access to court and for the conduct of fair procedure ought 
not, at the very least, to be viewed in the same light as the 
useful and instructive ones developed in the United Kingdom over 
the centuries. 
3. Specific instances of the aunlication of the Right of 
Access to Court 
As has been seen from the above discussion, a different 
approach is adopted with regard to the right of access to court 
in the United States, the European Community, the United Kingdom 
and Canada. In the United States, the right is essentially 
enforceable through constitutionally entrenching the right not 
to be deprived of property without due process of law, while in 
the European Community a specific right of access to court (very 
similar to section 34 of South Africa's Constitution) is 



























a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights at all, while 
Canada, while having a constitutionally-entrenched Charter, 
cannot be said to have a right of access to court in proprietary 
disputes simply because property rights are not constitutionally 
entrenched there. Despite the absence of con ti tutional 
protection, however, the common law of both last-mentioned· 
countries provides a right of access to court. There are numerous 
procedures of, and remedies attainable through, civil litigation 
which raise constitutional questions. Some of these will be 
considered below in the light of the experiences in the four 
jurisdictions mentioned above. 
3.1 Appeals 
Like all human beings judges and magistrates are fallible 
creatures who can, and often do, make mistakes. Depending on a 
variety of circumstances, including the presence or absence of 
certain prescribed requirements, one of two procedural mechanisms 
- appeal or review - is available to an aggrieved litigant to set 
aside the decision of a court or tribunal a quo. It would seem 
to be settled law that the main distinction between appeal and 
review is that in the case of the former it is only the result 
of the trial which is attacked, while in the case of the latter 
it is the method Qt the proceedings. In an appeal the primary 
question is whether the result(in the light of all the evidence 
placed before the court or tribunal) was right or wrong, while 
in a review it is not the correctness of the decision but its 
validity which is assailed112 Furthermore, in an appeal in order 
to determine whether or not the decision was correct or suitable 
112 See Herbstein and Van Winsen @ 932 to 933 and the 























the meri ts 113 may be considered :-14 In an appeal the appellate 
tribunal is confined, in reconsidering the merits, to the 
evidence on record and the application of the law thereto, 115 
whereas in the case of a review the court may look beyond the 
record in order to determine whether the proceedings (or 
decision) can stand. 
A number of common law grounds of judicial review have been 
recognised, and developed, by our courts. 116 Though it is not 
necessary for the purposes of this dissertation to mention and 
discuss all these grounds, it is perhaps important to note, for 
the purposes of the discussion which follows below, that at times 
the difference between appeal and review becomes somewhat blurred 
to define - particularly when the ground of review is,an abuse 
by the decision-maker of the discretion conferred upon him or her 
with regard to the weighing up of evidence, 117 or the taking into 






ie. the facts, applicable law and, where appropriate, 
policy considerations 
See South African Law Commission Report on the 
Investigation into the courts' powers of review of 
administrative acts (Project 24) @ 19 to 21 
Loe cit 
See, generally, idem @ 117 to 182 and, more 
specifically, Johannesburg Stock Exchange v 
Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 3 SA 132 (A) @ 152A-D 
Namely by taking a decision supported by no evidence, 
supported by evidence insufficient to reasonbaly 
warrant the decision taken or by ignoring undisputed 
evidence in arriving at the decision. See Theron v 
Ring van Wellington van die N Sendingkerk in suid-
Afrika 1976 2 SA 1 (A) at 13 et sequ, w c Greyling & 
Erasmus {Pty} Ltd v Johannesburg Local Road 
Transportation Board 1982 4 SA 427 (A) and SA Freight 
Cpnsolidators {Pty} Ltd v Chairman, National Transport 






















ones . 118 In these circumstances, according to Jansen JR;9 
29 
the 
subtle difference between appeal and review lies not in whether 
the court of review would have decided otherwise (which is the 
test in an appeal) but a narrower one - could the decision 
reasonably have been made. This is quite different to the test 
in civil litigation, namely, which version (if either) is the 
more probable one. 
It has long been recognised in the Rules of the High Court 
and by South African common law that the decision of any inferior 
court, tribunal, board or officer performing a judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative function120 , or of any other public 
body121 for that matter, is susceptible to review by the High 
Court. It is, furthermore, respectfully submitted that even if 
(and if so to the extent to which) an Act of Parliament might 
have been able to exclude the Court's common law powers of review 
prior to 27 April 1994 by means of an "ouster clause", 122 the 
constitutional enactment of the rights of access to the courts 







See, for example, Northwest Townships (Pty) Ltd v The 
Administrator, Transvaal 1975 4 SA 1 (T) @ 8 F - G, 
Minister of Law and Order and Another v Dempsey 1988 
3 SA 19 (A) and Visagie v State President 1989 3 SA 
859 (A) @ 868 B - C 
Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in 
Suid-Afrika (supra) @ 20D - F. 
URC 53 
See Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v 
Johannesburg Council 1903 TS 111 @ 115. See, too, 
generally Chapter 2 in SALC Report (Project 24) 
(supra) 
As was found to be the case by the majority in 
Staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988 4 SA . 
830 (A) 
In ss 22 and 24 of the 1993 Constitution, succeeded in 
























constitutional right of review notwithstanding legislation 
ousting the court's jurisdiction to scrutinise and, if 
appropriate, set aside irregular and ultra vires decisions. The 
same is not, however, necessarily true when it comes to appeals. 
Though provision is made for numerous appeals from decisions of 
a whole host of courts and tribunals,u4 a right of appeal in 
South Africa has traditionally only existed if the legislature 
has specifically conferred through legislation. 125 In some cases, 
for example an appeal from a magistrate's court to a high court, 
one may appeal as of right. In other cases, however, an appeal 
is not available as of right. Where, for example, a party wishes 
to appeal against the judgment of a superior court, he or she 
requires the leave of that court (failing which the leave of the 
Chief Justice) to lodge an appeal. Sometimes there is even a 
total denial of a right to appeal. An example is section 45 of 
the Small Claims Courts Act. 126 Another example is the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, 127 where, according 






See SALC Report (Project 24) @ 22 to 49 
Idem@ 89 
Act 61 of 1984. s 45 provides that no appeals shall 
lie from decisions of the small claims court. 
Decisions of the small claims courts are reviewable, 
in terms of s 46, on the following grounds (a) 
absence of jurisdiction on the court's part; (b) 
interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on 
the commissioner's part; (c) gross irregularity with 
regard to the proceedings. According to Haneke AJ in 
Smit v Seleka en Andere 1989 (4) SA 157 (0) @ 161H to 
I, the specific grounds of review set out in section 
46 do not exclude the Court's common law rights of 
review and, in any event, with one exception reflect 
the grounds of review of proceedings in the lower 
courts set out in section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 
(Act 59 of 1959) 
Hereafter referred to as the CCMA 























to a party against its decisions.u 9 The effect of such a denial 
might be that when such a forum makes a bona fide factual error 
in weighing up evidence, or in applying the law to such 
incorrectly found facts, or makes a bona fide error of law which 
does not constitute a "gross irregularity with regard to the 
proceedings", or which is otherwise unassailable according to 
the principles of review, 130 an erroneous judgment may stand. 
According to Herbstein and van Winsen 131 it is only if the 
judicial officer does not direct his or her mind to the issues 
before him or her, due to a mistake of law, and in so doing 
prevents the aggrieved party's case from being fully and fairly 
determined that such mistake amounts to a gross irregularity 
which is reviewable. 
In the light of the above can any law which restricts or 
denies an appeal be allowed to stand? Can (or, perhaps, ought) 
a right of appeal to be read as being implicit in, or as a 
natural corollary to, the right of access to the courts 
guaranteed by section 34 ? In attempting to answer these 
questions, it is submitted that regard ought to be had to the 




Though no appeal is provided for under the Act, a 
party may take the decision of a CCMA commissioner to 
the Labour Court on review in terms of s 145(1) on the 
limited grounds of review set out in that section, 
namely (a) misconduct by the commissioner in 
relation to his/her duties; (b) a gross irregularity 
in the conduct of the proceedings; (c) the 
commissioner exceeding his/her powers; (d) an improper 
obtaining of the award. 
See Herbstein and van Winsen @ pg. 934; Stephen v 
Gaius & the Magistrate of Nylstroom 1914 TPD 622 @ 
625; Makalima v Gubanxa 1918 CPD 58@ 63; and Zululand 
Cotton Fields Ltd v Ndumu Ltd (1926) 47 NLR 85. See 
too (with regard to arbitration proceedings) 
Hyperchemicals International (Pty) Ltd v Maybaker 
























(a) The United States 
It would seem that there is no general consitutional right 
in the United States to an appeal on the merits in civil 
litigation. It has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment, while 
guaranteeing due process, does not at the same time guarantee 
"immunity from judicial error". 132 In addition, even though an 
error has been made by a trial court, not every error which might 
otherwise found grounds for appeal consitutes "a failure to 
observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept 
of justice."133 Indeed where the parties have been fully heard 
(in other words where there has been procedural fairness) the 
fact that a court has come to an erroneous decision does not 
entitle the unsuccessful party to a constitutional right of 
appeal, since the mere coming to an erroneous decision has been 
held not to constitute a violation of his or her fundamental 
rights. 134 This principle has been applied to a number of 
circumstances including the following : an error in admitting 
evidence or entering judgment after a full hearing, 135 an 
erroneous interpretation by a state court of the decision of the 
Supreme Court, 136 a mistake as to the law of another state137 and 







See 16A American Jurisprudence 2d@ § 819, pg. 997 
Idem op loc cit 
Idem op loc cit and the cases cited infra footnote 56 
Jones v Buffalo creek coal & Coke co., 245 us 328, 62 
L Ed 325, 38 S Ct 261 
Rothschild & co v Steger & sons Piano Manufacturing 
,CQ., 256 Ill 196, 99 NE 920 
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co v Gold Issue Mining & 
Milling Co., 243 US 93, 61 L Ed 610, 37 S Ct 344; and 
Hall v Wilder Manufacturing Co., 316 Mo 812, 293 sw 























state . 138 
, Though a mere error by the trial court is, in itself, 
insufficient to violate the due process guarantee, it would seem 
that there may well be a denial of due process where the error 
is "gross and obvious, coming close to the boundary of arbitrary 
action. 11139 Unless the mistake is "not so gross as to be 
impossibJ.e in a rational administration of justice, it is no more 
than the imperfection of man, not a denial of constitutional 
rights. 11140 Al though there is no general constitutional right to 
an appeal in the United States, appellate relief is generally 
available in some form in both federal and state jurisdictions 
against the judgments of ordinary trial courts.i41 It is 
noteworthy, however, that in at least one jurisdiction in the 
United States there is no right of appeal against a decision of 
a small claims court. 142 
(b) The European Community 
According to van Dij k and van Hoof143 a right to appeal 
against a decision is neither laid down expressly in the European 







Howard v Kentucky. 200 us 164, 50 L Ed 421, 26 S Ct 
189 
See 16A Am Jur 2d, § 819, pg. 999 and Roberts v New 
York City. 295 us 264, 79 L Ed 1429, 55 S Ct 689 
See idem op loc cit and Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & 
Savings Co v Hill, 281 us 673, 74 L Ed 1107, 50 S Ct 
451 and Chicago Life Insurance Co v Cherry, 244 us 25, 
61 L Ed 966, 37 S Ct 492 
See F James and G C Hazard, Civil Procedure (2 ed) § 
13.6, @ pg 673 
Connecticut. See New Milford Block Co. V Ericson, 3 
Conn Cir 1, 206 A2d 487 






















noted by the European court in Delcourt v Belgium. 144 
Where an appeal has been provided in terms of the national 
legislation of a member state, however, and where civil rights 
or obligations are in dispute, the provisions of Article 6(1) (for 
example a "fair" hearing) do apply. These provisions do not, 
however, apply to applications for leave to appeal. 145 According 
to Beddard, 146 when an appeal is available, article 6 ( 1) is 
applied to the proceedings in their entirety. This is, of course, 
provided the various procedures, taken together, all constitute 
a "determination". 147 
(C) The United Kingdom 
Apart from a somewhat blanket right of appeal from some 
specified statutory tribunals to the courts on a point of law148 
there would appear to be no general common law right of appeal 
in the United Kingdom either. 149 Nonetheless it would seem that, 
in any event, in terms of the Rules of Court and legislation an 
appeal is typically available150 from the decision of every court 
thoughout the court hierarchy in the United Kingdom with a final 
appeal to the House of Lords. It would accordingly seem that 








1 EHRR 355 (1970) @ 366 § 25 
See van Dijk and van Hoof (supra) @ 306 
(Supra) @ 164 
See Macdonald et al, The European system for the 
protection of Human Rights, @ 371 and the case cited 
infra footnote 156 
Tribunals and Enquiries Act 1971, s 13 
See Jolowicz (supra) @ 148 
Albeit in some cases with the leave of the court a-quo 












legal system that in 1953 the Committee on Supreme Court Practice 
and Procedure had this to say to a suggestion that the right of 
appeal might be abolished to reduce costs : 151 
" The legal system of every civilized country 
recognises that judges are fallible and provides 
machinery for appeal in some form or another. The 
right of appeal in this country is too ingrained in 
our legal system to be capable of being uprooted in 
toto." 
Though the words "right of appeal" have, with respect to 
the learned Committee, perhaps been used somewhat loosely, the 
instances in which one cannot appeal from a court decision in the 
United Kingdom are indeed very few. 1~ 











There is no constitutional, or general, right of appeal in 
Canada. 153 There will, however, be a right in most instances for 
at least one appeal . 154 A rare instance in Canada in which the 
decision of a court is final and not subject to appeal is in the 
case of a decision of the small claims court where the amount in 






Final Report, 1953, Cmd. 8878 § 473, quoted in 
Jolowicz@ 170 
See Jolowicz (supra) @ 171 
See Watson (supra) @ 236 to 237 
Loe cit. Sometimes leave to appeal is a prerequisite 
\ 
for the exercise of such a right. See eg. Judicature 
&,:t. R S O 1970, c 223, ss 25 and Ontario Rule of 
Practice 499 























(e) South Africa 
The question of a right to appeal has surfaced, to some 
extent, in two cases before South Africa's Constitutional Court -
s v Rens156 and Besserglik v Minister of Trade. Industry and 
Tourism and Others (Minister of Justice Intervening) 1.s7 The 
applicants in the aforementioned two cases challenged the leave 
to appeal procedures laid down in section 316 (read with section 
315 (4)) of the Criminal Procedure Act158 and section 20 (4) (b) of 
the Supreme Court Act 159 respectively) . These sections provide, 
respectively, that the leave of the superior court a quo is 
necessary before a prospective appellant may appeal against 
judgments in criminal and civil cases. In both matters the 
Constitutional Court held the prescribed leave to appeal 
procedures not to be in conflict with the Constitution. In 
Besserglik, which dealt with the leave to appeal procedure in 
civil proceedings before the High Court, it was argued on behalf 
of the applicant that persons have the right to have their 
disputes determined fairly by a court until the final 
determination of the proceedings (which would ostensibly include 
a right of appeal) . 160 In her judgment, with which all the other 
members of the court concurred, O'Regan J referred to Ackermann 
J's doubts in Bernstein and others v Bester and others161 about 
the correctness of such a wide approach to section 22. 767 In· 








1996 (2) BCLR 155 (CC) 
1996 (6) BCLR 745 (CC) 
Act 51 of 1977 
Supra 
@ pp 749J to 750A 
Supra 























stated that it was a matter of some doubt whether the applicant 
was correct in his argument that the scope of section 22 extended 
as far as he had alleged. 163 It was, however, unanimously decided 
by the court that whatever the scope of section 22 was, it could 
not be said that the leave to appeal "screening procedure", which 
excludes "unmeritorious appeals", in itself amounted to a denial 
of the right of access to court . 164 While it is now settled law 
that the leave to appeal procedure does not militate against the 
right of access to court, the question of whether the right of 
access to court in civil litigation includes a right of appeal 
per se is still an open one. 
Unlike section 35 (3) (o) of the 1996 Constitution, 165 section 
34 does not expressly state that a fair hearing includes a right 
of appeal. Even the constitutional right of an accused in 
criminal proceedings is, in terms of section 35(3) (o), not an 
unlimited one. 166 Given this factor, in the light of the 
approaches mentioned above which prevail abroad (particularly in 
the United States and Europe) and given the fact that a right of 
revi,,ew is, in any event, available at common law, it is unlikely 
that our courts will imply a right of appeal on the merits after 
every non-criminal hearing. This may be cold comfort for a 
defendant before the small claims court, or a respondent before 
a compulsory CCMA arbitration, where judgment has gone against 
him or her and where there has clearly been a factual or legal 
error (albeit bona fide) on the commissioner's part. In such 





At pg. 750B 
At pg. 750C 
Which expressly provides that the right to a fair 
trial of an accused person (in criminal proceedings) 
includes a right of appeal to, or review by, a higher 
court 









recourse of an appeal to secure a "more correct determination" -
and this is aggravated by him/her having had no choice in the 
forum for the proceedings. Ferhaps in some such cases 
"unreasonableness"167 could be further developed, as a substantive 
ground of review, and applied in appropriate cases before that 
small (but important) class of public fora which exercise 
judicial functions yet deny parties before them a right to 
appeal. 














Does the right to have disputes which can be legally 
resolved in a fair public hearing include the right to be 
represented by counsel? Are provisions in Acts of Parliament 
which deny a litigant the right to be represented by a legal 
practitioner before a court168 or before another tribunal or 
forum169 unconstitutional? If there is a right to be legally 
represented (and where such right might be found to exist) does 
it ever include the right to have counsel appointed by the state 
where a litigant is of insufficient means to pay for his or her 
own counsel? In answering these questions the position in certain 




Strongly implied as a ground of review ins 33(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution relating to the right to just 
administrative action 
For example in the small claims court (see s 7(2) of 
'the Small Claims courts Act (supra)) 
For example in conciliation proceedings before the 
CCMA (see section 135(4) of the Labour Relations Act 























(a) · The United States 
In the United States, requirement (4) in Goldberg v Kelly170 , 
namely the right to retain counsel, has been considered by the 
United States Supreme Court ~n a number of occasions, it having 
been quite pertinently put in Powell v Alabama171 that 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
of law ... He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence ... He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have 
a perfect one. " 
In Smit' s opinion172 the Goldberg v Kelly decision leaves 
little doubt that one has an unqualified right to "retained" 
legal counsel in civil cases. Detracting somewhat from Smit's 
opinion is the decision of Walters v National Association for 
Radiation Survivors, 173 which concerned a challenge on 
consitutional grounds to a law which effectively denied a veteran 
the right to paid legal counsel by limiting the fee payable to 
an attorney representing a veteran before the Veteran's 
Administration to a maximum of$ 10.00. In the Walters matter the 
court held that the procedure before the Veteran's Association 
was intended to operate on "an informal, nonadversary basis 






287 US 45, 68-69, 53 S Ct 55, 77 L Ed 158 (1932), see 
Smit (supra)@ 453 
@ 454 























and that "the fee limitation was fair because it did not prevent 
claimants from making a meaningful presentation prose, with an 
attorney working on a pro bono basis, or with unpaid, nonlegal 
counsel." 174 Admittedly, the Walters matter did not deal with 
proceedings before a court of law which required the formal 
pleading and presentation of cases and detailed rules of 
evidence. Tribe suggests, 1 ~ however, that restrictions to limit 
a litigant's choice of competent counsel to any significant 
degree (with the concomitant limitation on the litigant's ability 
to petition the courts for redress), might, in the future, be 
subjected to First Amendement176 scrutiny (as opposed to being 
argued on the basis of a denial of due process). 
A question which has been left somewhat open is whether one 
has a right to assigned counsel177 in civil cases. Prior to 1981 
this question was largely undecided, depi te the decision of 
Boddie v Connecticutm which intimated that a litigant might be 
constitutionally entitled to assigned counsel in an appropriate 
case. In 1981, however, the Supreme Court provided some 
guidelines in Lassiter v Department of Social Services. 179 In that 
case it was said that there was a "presumption" that an indigent 
litigant had a right to assigned counsel where he or she risked 
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Which guarantees, inter alia, freedom of speech 
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Court held, however, that the question whether a party is 
entitled to assigned counsel depends on whether the presence of 
counsel could make a "determinative difference. " 181 In determining 
whether counsel could make such a difference, the circumstances 
of each particular case have to be considered and the following 
factors weighed and balanced against one another: the nature 
of the private interests affected, the risk of error in the 
determination by the court, and the governmental interests in 
supporting the continued use of the challenged procedure . 182 
Though guidelines have been set in Lassiter, the precise content 
of the right is, unfortunately, far from certain. 
(b) The European Community 
The importance. of the Golder183 decision, as has already been 
seen, can be found in the fact that it recognised Article 6(1) 
of the European Convention as embodying the right to a court. It 
ought not to be forgotten that the principal issues in the case 
centred around the refusal of the authorities of the prison(where 




of South Africa; Matiso and Others v Commanding 
Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1382 (CC) in which it was held that certain 
sections of the Magistrates' Courts Act (Act 32 of 
1944) which effectively permitted civil imprisonment 
for debt were invalid, it would seem that the only 
circumstances in South Africa in which someone risks 
his or her liberty arising out of non-criminal 
proceedings are arrests tanquam suspectus de fuga, 
arrests ad fundandum and ad confirmandam 
jurisdictionis, contempt of court applications and 
applications for commital pursuant to the Mental 
Health Act (Act 18 of 1973) 
452 U S at 33 
These factors are in accordance with the forumula in 
























solicitor with a view to bringing a defamation suit against one 
of the prison officers. The basis of the refusal by the 
authorities was that they were of the view that Golder's proposed 
action had no reasonable prospect of succeeding. In that matter 
it was held that to contact a solicitor with regard to an 
intended action: 
" was a normal preliminary step in itself and in 
Gol.der' s case probably essential on account of his 
imprisonment. By forbidding Golder to make such 
contact, the Home Secretary actually impeded the 
launching of the contemplated action ... Hindrance in 
fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal 
impediment. " 181 
In a separte concurring judgment, it was furthermore held per Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice J that : 
"A practice whereby contact with a solicitor about 
possible legal proceedings is refused because the 
executive authority has determined that the prisoner 
has no good legal ground of claim, not only cannot be 
justified as 1necessary' ... - it cannot be justified 
at all, because it involves the usurpation of what is 
essentially a judicial function. " 185 
By holding that Golder had a right to court, the European 
Court by strong implication also held that Golder had a right of 
access to a legal representative - if not for the purposes of 
appearing on his behalf at the very least for the purposes of 
consultation with regard to a proposed lawsuit. If there were any 
184 
185 
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doubt as to the existence of a right to counsel in civil 
proceedings before courts of law in the European Community, it 
such doubt was largely removed by the Airey186 case. Airey 
c' oncerned an Irish citizen who wished to sue for judicial 
separation but could not afford the costs of legal representation 
and no legal aid was available in Ireland. The court held that 
in view of the factors such as Airey's vocation and background 
and the complexity of High Court rules and procedures in general, 
and those relating to'judicial separation in particular, it was 
"most improbable"187 that she would have been able to effectively 
present her case in the High Court without legal assistance and 
that, in the absence of the availability of legal aid, she had, 
effectively, been denied the right of access to court. Admitedly 
the Court did not say that there was always a right to legal 
representation in all civil proceedings and though it was careful 
not to hold that there was a duty on the State to provide 
unlimited legal aid in all civil cases, 188 it was the State which 
had the choice of the means 189 to achieve the end. 190 The court 
nonetheless held that despite the fact that it was only in 
relation to criminal proeedings that the Convention gave one an 
express right to legal representation, 191 Article 6(1) sometimes 
compelled the State to provide for the assistance, of a lawyer 
when such assistance "proves indispensable for an effective 
access to court" either because legal representation is rendered 
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(c) The United Kingdom 
According to Jackson193 a right to be represented by counsel 
is recognised in all actions before the ordinary courts in the 
United Kingdom. This right is, however, still not allowed in some 
administrative tribunals. Though the courts have recognised the 
importance of legal representation in hearings before tribunals, 
it would seem that whether such right existed in any given case 
depended on the peculiar facts of that case . 194 A factor which 
might hold sway is whether a member of a private club had, by 
contract, agreed to be bound by the rules of the club which 
included (expressly or by necessary implication) a prohibition 
of legal representation at disciplinary hearings. 195 It would seem 
that whether a right to be represented exists, at least in 
domestic tribunals, will also depend on factors such as the 
seriousness of the charge and of the consequences. 196 It would 
seem that no right is recognised to have counsel appointed by the 
Crown under English common law. Legal aid is, however, available 
to the poorer members of society who meet the means test. 197 As 
Jolowicz points out, 198 however, the great majority of people who 
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cannot afford to become involved in litigation unless the issues 
involved are of "overwhelming importance to them." 
(d) Canada 
In Canada the right to a fair trial includes the right to 
be represented by the counsel of one's choice . 199 With regard to 
the question of a right to have counsel appointed in civil 
litigation, in common with the situation in the United Kingdom, 
South Africa and many other countries, legal aid is available in 
Canada to civil litigants who qualify therefor. 200 There is, 
however, no constitutional right to have paid counsel appointed 
by the Crown for a civil litigant nor has such a principle been 
developed in Canadian common law. 201 
(e) South Africa 
(i) The right generally 
No reported decision could be found where the right to legal 
representation before the ordinary courts of law was ever cast 
into doubt. The likely reasons for this are simple. In the first 
instance our civil procedural system is English in origin and 
such a right is recognised in English common law. Secondly, the 
rules of the superior and magistrates' courts have invariably 
made provision for persons appearing before them to be 
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appear to be settled law that one has the right to legal 
representation before the ordinary courts of law. Such a right 
was assumed by Innes CJ in Dabner v South Africa Railways and 
Harbours203 who stated204 "No Roman-Dutch authority was quoted as 
establishing the right of legal representation before tribunals 
other than courts of law, and I know of none. 11 (my emphasis) . 
This view is confirmed by Rose Innes205 who states206 : "In a court 
of law an accused or a litigant is entitled to bring his counsel 
into court to represent him. Every person is entitled to obtain 
for himself legal representation at his trial and should be 
afforded an opportunity of doing so when the opportunity is 
reasonably demanded. " 207 It has, furthermore, been held "The 
right of access to one's legal adviso.r2°8 , as a corollary of the 
right of access to the courts, is a basic or fundamental common 
law right. 11 (my emphasis) 209 For our purposes, however, the 
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See too Knight v Die Voorsittende Beampte, 
Onderhoudshof Schweitzer-Reineke 1978 (3) SA 732 (T) 
where such a right, before the maintenance court 
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by definition, is still a form of legal assistance. 
See Hosking and Another v Van Der Merwe and Another 
NNO 1992 (1) SA 906 (W) @ 925H - 926A 
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question remains whether (notwithstanding the apparent common law 
right to legal representation before ordinary courts of law) a 
denial of legal representation in any court of law (or for that 
matter in another tribunal or forum) always amounts to an 
infringement of one's right of access to court (construed as 
including a fair public hearing). Once again the situation in two 
such fora - the small claims court and the CCMA ~ will be 
considered. 
Because the ordinary courts use the adversarial procedure 
which carries all the technical baggage which accompanies it 
(such as pleadings, exclusionary rules, the duty to begin, onuses 
of proof, legal argument, et cetera), it would sem to have been 
accepted that a person has the right to be legally represented 
before them. Unlike quasi-judicial administrative tribunals, 
there are, furthermore, the far more serious risks which are 
typically attendant upon litigation before the ordinary courts210 
(not the least of which include substantial legal costs -
whatever the outcome - and the risk of serious pecuniary loss). 
The small claims court is on a different footing entirely. Its 
procedure is very informal - and for all practical purposes there 
are no pleadings. The rules of evidence are (compared with other 
courts of law) very relaxed and the commissioner is, in terms of 
the Act, enjoined to proceed "inquisitorially". All questions are 
asked by him or her except where he or she gives leave in rare 
circumstances to a party to put any questions to a witness. In 
effect the commissioner is meant to elicit all facts which are 
necessary to place him or her in a position to fairly determine 
the matter. One might be tempted to argue that notwithstanding 
the above, no overwhelmingly good reason exists why a party ought 
not to be entitled to have his or her legal representative 
present to "represent", or at least to be able to advise him or 
























her at the hearing. The other party need not even be prejudiced 
in these circumstances by a costs order if he or she loses. The 
fact remains, however, that whole purpose of the small claims 
court is to afford speedy justice in a simple and inexpensive 
way. Even though the small claims court is technically a "court 
of law", 211 performing judicial funcions, in view of the 
simplified procedure and commissioner's very different role to 
that of a judge or magistrate, the commissioner is (on pain of 
his or her ruling being set aside by the High Court) obliged to 
be impartial and fair and there is very little scope (or real 
need) for legal representatives. 
As far as the CCMA is concerned, it is only in conciliation 
(and not in arbitration) proceedings that a party is deprived of 
the right to be legally represented. As no "finding" affecting 
the rights of either party is made during conciliation, there 
would seem to be no prejudice to either party by disallowing 
legal representation for a party to conciliation proceedings. In 
view of the above it is accordingly doubted whether the denial 
of legal representation, for example, in the small claims courts 
and in conciliation proceedings before the CCMA constitutes an 
infringement of one's right of access to court. 
An attempt to imply an unqualified right to legal 
representation in s 34 in all civil procedures would, it is 
submitted, come up against at least two further obstacles. The 
first is the maxim - inclusio uni us est exclusio al terius -
apparently considered by Ackermann Jin his obiter remarks in 
Bernstein and others v Bester. and Others NNO. 212 Notwithstanding 
the reworded Access to Court provision, when one compares the 
broad reference to a "fair public hearing" in section 34 with the 
detailed provisions of section 35(3) which set out precisely what 
211 
212 
Though not a "court of record" sees 2 of the Act 




I a fair trial "includes" for an accused in~ criminal matter, the 
conclusion is inescapable that the drafters of the Constitution 
I could not have intended each and every element expressly regarded 


















in every civil matter. This view, it would seem, is to some 
extent supported by the decision in Myburgh v Voorsitter van die 
Schoemanspark Ontspanningsklub Dissiplinere Verhoor en 'n Ander213 
where Haneke J declined to hold that the Constitution was of any 
assistance to an employee who desired legal representation in 
proceedings before a domestic disciplinary committee. In that 
matter the learned judge stated (obiter it would appear) that the 
then-prevailing provision in the Constitution relating to the 
rights of accused persons 214 was inapplicable as it differed from 
the equality and access to courts provisions215 and that 
accordingly it was not warranted to amend the common law by 
extending it to all disciplinary hearings before domestic 
tribunals. 216 
The other obstacle to an argument seeking to imply an 
unqualified right to legal representation is premised on the very 
fact that the common law rules of natural justice have not, as 
yet, been construed always to include a right to legal 
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See J D Van der Vyver "The private sphere in 
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tribunals which exercise a quasi-judicial function. 218 In many 
such cases it was held that the discretion to allow or disallow 
legal representation vested in the tribunal its elf. 219 To the 
extent to which our courts have grappled with the question of 
whether in the exercise of its discretion the tribunal ought to 
have allowed legal assistance or representation, they have held 
that cirucmstances in which one is entitled to have legal 
assistance, or to be legally represented, include when the 
proceedings constitute a step in litigation hostile to the person 





"It goes without saying• that a person who finds 
himself (or herself) in the complexities of difficult 
factual and legal matters against a background of 
seriously difficult consequences for his (or her) 
personal status, position and prestige and who is not 
afforded the opportunity of legal representation, is 
not really afforded the opportunity of being able to 
put his (or her) case" (my translation) 
See Smith v Beleggende Outoriteit, Kornmandement Noord-
Traansvaal 1980 (3) SA 510 (O) @ 523F - 524H (which 
dealt with a military tribunal) and Morali v President 
of the Insustrial Court 1987 (1) SA 130 (C) @ 133D 
(which dealt with the industrial court which,. despite 
its title and functions, was an administrative - and 
not a judicial - tribunal) 
See idem and Hoskins v Van Der Merwe (supra) (which 
dealt with interrogation proceedings in terms of the 
Insolvency Act (Act 24 of 1936)) 
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598 (A) @ 603A-E; Hoskins v Van Der Merwe (supra) @ 
924E 























Wiechers' opinion222 is that the question of whether legal 
representation before a tribunal should be allowed ought not to 
be whether t~e law provides for such representation but rather 
whether the person has "considering the nature and scope of the 
administrative-enquiry and the possible consequences thereof for 
the subject's rights and privileges, really been given the 
opportunity to put his case ?"223 It is submitted that such an 
approach has much to commend itself - and is the approach which 
ought to be applied by the High (and Constitutional) Courts in 
deciding whether the denial of legal representation before 
tribunals or fora (which are concerned with the determination of 
rights and obligational disputes) resulted in the denial of a 
"fair" hearing. 
(ii) A right to civil legal aid? 
In the light of the above it is perhaps not surprising that 
the courts have hitherto not construed our common law to include 
a right to have legal representation provided for indigents 
before the courts - not even in criminal trials224 where the 
possible consequences can affect not only one's property 
interests but very often one's liberty. Section 35(3) (g) of the 
1996 Constitution leaves no doubt that an accused person in 
criminal proceedings now has the right to have a legal 
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simple or complex, inquisitorial or adversarial, 
whether skilled cross-examination is necessary, 
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determination by the court, tribunal or forum will 
have on the parties 
























expense, if subtantial injustice would otherwise result. " It is 
submitted, in view of the complexities and technical nature of 
criminal proceedings, that "substantial justice would otherwise 
result" whenever an accused who faces the possibility of direct 
imprisonment without the option of a fine goes unrepresented. 225 
It is beyond the purview of this dissertation, however, to 
consider this question any further. 
The same obstacles set out above in relation to implying a 
general right to legal representation in non-criminal matters 
will, it is submitted, apply mutatis mutandis to an argument in 
which it is sought to imply a right in section 34 to have 
qualified legal representation paid for by the state for an 
indigent civil litigant. It has been suggested by writers such 
as Van Wyk et al, 226 that the equality aspect of a right to a 
fair hearing should "ideally" ensure that a party's ability to 
fully participate in the trial does not depend on "irrelevant 
criteria" such as "social or economic status." It has also been 
stated that the guarantee of equality of arms has been seriously 
compromised by the fact that, given the adversarial system in the 
ordinary courts, an indigent representing himself or herself 
stands on a considerably weaker footing to an opponent who can 
afford a legal representative. 227 Nonetheless, it has also been 
recognised, 228 that the right to legal aid in civil matters raises 
difficult questions - particularly concerning the allocation of 
scarce financial resources. 
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unlimited legal aid to all indigent litigants. 229 Nonetheless, 
despite the obstacles refered to above, in view of the fact that 
the wording of section 34 is considerably similar to Article 6(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, and notwithstanding 
the existence of a legal aid system with the (albeit) limited 
assistance to civil litigants, it is not beyond the realms of 
possibility that the interpretation which the European Court 
adopted in the Airey case230 could be applied in certain cases 
where an indigent and uneducated civil litigant finds him or 
herself before a High or magistrates' court with little idea as 
to the procedure. In such cases it is submitted that the absence 
of a legal representative would amount to an effective denial 
of the litigant's right of access to court. 
(iii) Juristic persons in certain superior courts 
A final aspect relating to legal representation which has 
possible constitutional ramifications is the somewhat peculiar 
and anomalous situation with regard to juristic persons in the 
High and Constitutional courts. In terms of prevailing 
legislation231 only an advocate, or an attorney who has been 
granted the right of appearance in the High Court in terms of 
section 4(2) of the Right of Appearance in Courts Act of 1995, 232 
may appear in the High Court on behalf of another person. 233 While 
a natural person may appear on his or her own behalf in a 
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by one of its officers, directors or employees (as the case may 
be) in other courts, such as the magistrates' courts, 234 the 
labour courts, 235 and even the labour appeal court. 236 In criminal 
trials a juristic person's officer may also be cited in a 
representative capacity. 237 A juristic person may not, however, 
be represented in a high court by anyone other than an advocate 
or an attorney having right of appearance. 238 
In determining the constitutionality of the situation 
referred to above, it is suggested that both sections 9(1) and 
34 of the 1996 Constitution may be of assistance. Firstly, in 
respect section 9 ( 1} ( the equality provision), it is arguable 
that a natural person and a juristic person are placed on a 
different footing as far as appearance in the high and 
constitutional courts is concerned. A natural person is entitled 
to appear in person, while a juristic person is compelled to be 
represented by a duly qualified legal representative 
(notwithstanding any financial hardship which this might 
occasion) . Furthermore, if the juristic person is unable to 
afford legal representation (and in the absence of legal aid 
which is not available to juristic persons) such juristic person 
is effectively barred from having its side heard in any disupte 
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see s 161 of the Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 
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(Act 66 of 1995) 
And may, accordingly, effectively "represent" the 
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criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977) 
See Herbstein and Van Winsen at pg. 26 and the cases 























constitutional court. It would also seem from Melunsky J's 
judgment in A K Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and 
Securi ty239 that there would seem to be any reason why the right 
to equality ought not, in appropriate cases, to be enjoyed by a 
juristic person. 
Secondly there is the right of access to court itself which, 
according to Erasmus, 240 is one of the rights of which a juristic 
person can be the bearer. 241 In the light of the above, it is 
somewhat regretted that Hurt J held in Hallowes v The Yacht Sweet 
Waters 212 that "the right to present one's own case is a right 
which cannot vest in a juristic person, since it is, by nature, 
not a right which a juristic person can exercise,"213 and that, 
accordingly, there could be no constitutional objection to the 
procedural requirement that a company be represented in the high 
court by a legal representative. 244 It is respectfully submitted 
that the learned judge, in so deciding, adopted a far too 
restricted approach to the capacity of a juristic person to 
perform acts. Though it has been said that an artificial person, 
such as a company, has "no body to kick and no soul to damn" , 245 
an artificial person such as a company has the same capacity to 
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and do perform their acts, and formulate their intentions, 
through those officers actually in control - usually its 
directors. 246 Accordingly there can be no doubt that in terms of 
the 1996 Constitution a juristic person is, at the very least, 
entitled to the same right of access to court as a natural 
person. 
There can furthermore be no justification in the anomalous 
and arbitrary barring of officers and directors from representing 
their companies in civil matters in the high court and 
constitutional matters in the constitutional court (on the one 
hand), but not barring them from appearing in a representative 
capacity in criminal matters ( in any court) or in civil and 
labour matters in other courts. This anomaly is aggravated by the 
fact that many company directors {who have some legal or 
commercial background) are more intellectually skilled and 
educated than some laypersons - and yet it is only the former who 
are barred from appearing in person in the two fora referred to 
above. Such failure to allow an officer of a juristic person to 
appear on its behalf must fall foul of both s 34 ands 9(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution, and can, furthermore, only be described 
as unreasonable and unjustifiable. 
3.3 summary Judgment 
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure, which is 
available in both the high247 and magistrates'248 courts, is to 
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specifications249 to obtain judgment without having to go to trial 
- despite the fact that the defendant has, by delivering a notice 
of intention to defend, indicated that he or she intends raising 
a defence. 250 The singular purpose of summary judgment is to 
enable a plaintiff who has a clear case to obtain enforcement of 
his or her claim against a defendant who has no real defence. 251 
The procedure is a simple one - a plaintiff deposes to an 
affidavit confirming the cause of action and stating that in his 
or her view the defendant has no bona fide defence and has 
entered an appearance to defend solely for the purposes of 
delaying the plaintiff's claim. A defendant, if he or she wishes 
to resist summary judgment and cannot (or does not wish to} pay 
security for the judgment (inclusive of costs), is then obliged 
to go on his or her defence by filing an answering affidavit 
which must set out and fully disclose the nature and grounds of 
the alleged defence. There can be no doubt that summary judgment 
is an extraordinary and drastic procedure which, if granted, 
effectively closes the court's door to a defendant. The 
defendant's right to be heard is, furthermore, limited to his or 
her answering affidavit (which may be supplemented with the leave 
of the court by oral evidence252 or by supplementary affidavit253 }. 
The question has been asked:54 whether "the procurement of a final 
judgment by means of summary proceedings imposes an unreasonable 







Namely, is a claim (a} based on a liquid document; (b} 
for a liquidated amount in money; (c) for delivery of 
specified movable property; or (d} for ejectment 
See Herbstein and van Winsen (supra) @ 434 
Loe cit 
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(a) The United States 
United States Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs the 
summary judgment procedure. The procedure which is followed is 
also an application, launched by the plaintiff, and supported by 
affidavits which set out uncontested facts on which the action 
is based. If these facts are not disputed in the defendant's 
answering affidavits, or if the defendant's answering affidavits 
fail to divulge any facts which, if true, would exclude any basis 
upon which judgment might be entered for the plaintiff, the court 
is entitled to grant summary judgment. 255 The purpose of summary 
judgment is not to resolve any issues which form part of the 
duties of the trial court - it is rather to see whether there are 
such issues. 256 
There is, however, a duty on a defendant resisting an 
application for summary judgment to set out specific facts in 
his/her answering affidavit which show that there is a ~genuine 
issue" for trial. 257 Clearly because of the procedure's drastic 
consequences, courts in the United States have been enjoined to 
be ultra cautious in granting applications for summary judgment. 
Judge Jerome Frank put it as follows : 
"trial judges should exercise great care in granting 
motions for summary judgment. A litigant has a right to a 
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facts . ... ,,zso 
Given the very fact that in many matters which have gone to 
the United States Supreme Court where summary judgment had been 
granted a quo, the granting thereof was upheld, there would 
appear to be no question that the procedure, where correctly and 
cautiously used, is constitutional. 259 
(b) The European Community 
No European Court authority could be found which deal 
specifically with summary judgment procedures, though procedures 
akin to summary judgment which do exist in the legal systems of 
some of the Community's member states. Germany260 and Italy261 are 
but two such examples. It is submitted that these procedures · 
would not fall foul of Article 6 ( 1) provided they give an 
adequate opportunity to the defendant to be heard. If any support 
of this contention is necessary, it is submitted that the views 







"All normal legal systems - including most certainly 
the English one - have procedures whereby, at a very 
early stage of the proceedings, a case can ... be 
"struck out" as frivolous or vexatious or as 
disclosing no cause of action (grounds roughly 
Doebler Metal Furniture Co v United States, 149 F 2d 
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See Peter Gottwald Zivilprozessrecht 15 ed (1993) 992 
See M Cappelletti and J M Perillo Civil Procedure in 











analogous to the 'abuse of right of petition', or 
'manifestly ill founded' petition, in Human Rights 
terminology) . " 263 
Because the purpose of summary judgment is to speedily enforce 
a plaintiff's rights against a defendant who has no defence and 
who is simply "abusing" the system to delay a plaintiff's claim, 
it is submitted that the above view would probably (and indeed 
ought) also to be taken with regard to defendants with frivilous 
defences or allegations which, even if true, disclose no defence. 













The summary judgment procedure in England is presently 
governed by Order 14, and the grounds for applying therefor are 
analogous to those which exist in South Africa. 264 As is the case 
in South Africa, a defendant will be granted "leave to defend" 
if he or she satisfies the court that there is a triable issue 
or question or that there ought "for some other reason" to be a 
trial of the claim or part thereof. 265 To so satisfy the court, 
the defendant has to put forward grounds for a defence which, if 
true, would have a reasonable prospect of success. 266 It would 





At§ 15, pg. 555 
In terms of Order 14, rule 2 (1) the deponent must 
state, on oath, that in his/her view the defendant has 
no defence or has no defence except as to the quantum 
of damages. 
Order 14, rule 3(1) 
In the wording used in Order 14, rule 3 (1), the 
defendant must satisfy the court "that there is an 
issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried 













judgment unless the case is an absolutely clear one. 267 According 
to Erasmus268 other countries in which the procedure is also 
available include Scotland269 and Israel. 270 
(d) South Africa 
Because of its drastic nature South African courts have, 
like their foreign counterparts, traditionally been loath to 
grant summary judgment other than in circumstances where the 
plaintiff has, in effect, an unanswerable case. 271 South African 
courts will only grant summary judgment when this fact is 
established "beyond reasonable doubt" and where it does not 
appear that "a reasonable possibility" exists that injustice may 
be done if summary judgment is granted. 272 It is doubted whether 
the summary judgment procedure falls foul of section 34. In the 

















See Jolowicz at pg. 161 
Supra@ pg. A2-18 
See Macphail "Summary Adjudication in Civil 
Proceedings in Scotland" in I R Scott (ed) 
International Perspectives on Civil Justice (1990) @ 
67 
See Goldstein "Summary Judgment Proceedings in Israeli 
Law" in IR Scott (ed) International Perspectives on 
Civil Justice (1990) @ 11 
See Herbstein and van Winsen (supra) @ 435 
See, for example, Edwards v Menezes 1973 (1) SA 299 
(NC) ; Arend & another v Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd 
197 4 ( 1) SA 298 (C) . @ 314B-C; Breitenbach Y fiat SA 
(Edmsl Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T) @ 229-in fine; District 
Bank v Hoosain 1984 (4) SA 544 (C) @ 550. There would, 
furthermore, appear to be an "ever. increasing 
reluctance" to grant summary judgment where 
applications therefor are opposed (see Dowson & Dobson 
Industrial Ltd v Van der Werf & others 1981 (4) SA 417 























defendant is still given the opportunity to place his or her 
defence before the court by affidavit and the defendant, 
furthermore, has the right to appeal against the granting of 
summary judgment. 273 It is respectfully submitted that the 
procedure is "reasonable and justifiable" and, at the very least, 
is recognised as being acceptable in a number of "open and 
democratic societies". 
It is furthermore submitted that the summary judgment 
procedure will easily survive an argument (based on the equality 
clause) that the procedure discriminates against defendants in 
that it places an onus on the defendant. In the first instance, 
the defendant hardly has to prove the truth of its defence at the 
summary judgment stage on a balance of probabilities (being the 
ordinary civil standard). All the defendant need do is to ensure 
that the court does not find that the plaintiff's claim is 
unanswerable beyond reasonable doubt and in doing so he or she 
need simply state in an affidavit what his or her defence is 
(which would have to be done, in any event, if he or she filed 
his or her plea). The only test is that the defence, if true, 
must be a legally valid one. In any event, even if the defendant 
could be said to bear some "onus", or evidentiary burden, in 
summary judgment proceedings, it has been stated by the 
Constitutional Court per Didcott J274 that in civil ii tigation one 
side or other invariably has to bear the onus of proof, that 
differentiation between the parties is inevitable and that the 
location of the onus depends •not on doctrinaire considerations 




See Eramus (supra) @ A2-18 and the cases cited infra 
footnote 3 
























Even if, notwithstanding these facts, one subscribes to the 
view that the procedure prima facie, infringes a defendant's 
right of access to court, such infringement, it is respectfully 
submitted, must be justifiable in terms of the general limitation 
clause. 
3.4 Pre-trial judgments and orders dismissing claims or 
striking out defences 
A number of magistrates' court, high court and even 
constitutional court rules visit a party's default or non-
compliance with the rules with the.possible sanction of dismissal 
of the action (in the case of a plaintiff) or striking out of a 
defence (in the case of a defendant). By way of illustration, 
there are rules allowing for the granting of default judgment in 
the plaintiff's favour, where the defendant has not filed a 
notice of intention to defend or, where having filed same, has 
failed to file a plea.~ 6 There are rules granting the court the 
power to dismiss a plaintiff's claim, or to strike out a 
defendant's defence, where the party concerned fails: to furnish 
trial particulars; 277 to comply with a request by the other party 
to remedy an irregular step timeously; 278 to comply with a court 
order compelling him or her to comply with a particular rule of 





URC 31(2) (a) and MCR 12(1) (a) and 12(1) (b) (ii). In the 
case of default · judgment where the defendant has 
failed to file a plea, the plaintiff must first place 
the defendant under "bar" in terms of URC 26, or MCR 
12(1) (b) (i), as the case may be 
URC 21(4) 
URC 30(5) 










for inspection; 280 to comply with an order given at a pre-trial 
conference presided over by a judge; 28 i and to comply with rules 
relating to the format of court documents. 282 The court may, 
furthermore, grant judgment in favour of a party if the other 
party fails to appear in court on the day appointed for trial, 
283 and may deny a defendant who has been barred in terms of the 
rules from appearing on the date of the trial "unless the 
interests of justice" otherwise demand. 284 If the court does 
exercise its power to dismiss a claim, or strike out a defence, 
the litigant adversely affected has clearly had the court's doors 
closed in his or her face. Does this mean that all these 
provisions conflict with the right of access to court? Once again 













(a) The United states 
One of the powers which the courts in the United States have 
in terms of their civil procedural . rules285 , is to dismiss the· 
action of a "recalcitrant" claimant and to enter default judgment 









URC Cape Rule 37A(10) (g) (iv) and (v) (with effect from 
01/12/1997) 
CCR 31 ( 3 ) ( c) 
URC 39(1) and (3) 
URC 39(2) 
apart from the wide variety of other sanctions to 
penalise the default or negligence of a party include 
prohibiting the defaulting party from introducing 
evidence (or specified types of evidence) and .the 
power to strike out a claim or a defence in its 
entirety 
See James and Hazard, (supra) @ 210 and Federal Rule 



















to dismiss a claim and to strike out a defence has not yet been 
ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court per se, 
but its use has, in certain circumstances, been held to 
constitute a denial of due process, but not in others 28 ' For 
example in Hoye¥ v Elliqtt,288 where the defendant's defence was 
struck out and judgment entered against him because of his 
failure to obey a court order, it was held that due process had 
been denied. In Hamm.2nd Packing co. v Arkansas / 89 however, where 
a similar order had been granted, it was held that due process 
had not been denied where one of the parties failed to produce 
evidence. The basis of distinguishing between these two cases was 
that in the second case the court a quo was justified in entering 
judgment as it did because it could reasonably presume that a 
party who refused to produce e'1idence lacked a meri tori us 
defence. Similarly in SQciet~ Internationale pour ~artici~ations 
Industrielles et comm,erciales s Av Rogers290 it was held to be 
a denial of due process where a party, who failed to comply with 
an order to -discover, had made a bona fide effort to do so but 
could not without subjecting himself to criminal sanctions under 







167 US 409, ii S Ct 841, 42 L Ed 217 ( 1897) 
212 US 409, 17 S Ct 370, 53 L Ed 530 ( 1909) 
357 US 197, 210, 78 S Ct 1087, 1095, 2 L Ed 2d 1255, 
1266 {1958) 
see too National Hockey League v Metropolitan Hockey 
League Inc 427 Us 639, 96 s Ct 2778, 49 L Ed 2d 747 
{1976}and Link v Wabash RR 370 us 626, a2_s ~t 1586, 
a L Ed 2d 734 {1962) in relation to the dismissal of 
an action for failure by plaintiff's counsel to attend 










(b) The European Community 
What has been said in the above discussion relating to the 
summary judgment procedure in European Community countries 
applies, it is submitted, equally in relation to the European 
approach to striking out of defences and dismissal of actions. 
It could perhaps be added that given that it has been accepted 
in principle that a party who fails to comply with prescibed 
court p·rocedures, while knowing such procedures to exist, such 
a party can be assumed to have waived his or her Article 6(1) 
rights, 292 in circumstances of gross non-compliance. 













Under the law of the United Kingdom293 a party may in certain 
circumstances apply to strike out any pleading. 294 Should . the 
applicant party be successful in having the pleading concerned 
struck out, the court has the power not only to stay the action 
but also to dismiss it or enter judgment accordingly. 295 
Given the drastic nature of an order dismissing a claim or 
entering judgment for the plaintiff, the English courts tend to 
exercise their powers to do so with great circumspection296 and 






Colozza v Italy (supra) 
RSC Order 18, rule 19 
Namely where it discloses no reasonable cause of 
action or defence, as the case may be; or is 
scandalous, frivilous or vexatious; or it may 
prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the 
action; or it is otherwise an abuse of the process of 
the Court. 
Order 18, rule 19(1) 























almost incontestably bad", "in plain and obvious cases"297 or if 
the court is satisfied that the case cannot be improved by an 
amendment. 298 The purpose of the remedy to strike out is to 
prevent matters from proceeding to trial which disclose no 
reasonable cause of action or defence and which are clearly 
"doomed to failure". 299 
The courts in the united Kingdom also have powers to grant 
judgment in favour of a party due to default of the other party 
to file his or her statement of claim or defence, as the case may 
be. 300 The courts also have the power to proceed with a trial in 
the absence of one of the parties should the other party fail 
to appear. 301 Any judgment given in the absence of a party may, 
however, be set aside on application. 302 It would seem that there 
would have to be sufficient cause to set aside such a judgment 
such as an unavoidable accident preventing a party from 
appearing. 303 The court may, futhermore, dismiss a Plaintiff's 








Loe cit and Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410 
@ 419 and Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633@ 648 
see Hubbuck y Weeks [1913] 1 Ch 438 and Republic of 
Peru v Peruvian Guano co (1887) 36 Ch D 489 
See Jolowicz at pg. 145 
Order 19, rules 1 and 2 
Order 35, rule 1(2) 
Order 35, rule 2 
see for example Re Barraclough [1967] P 1; (19651 2 
All ER 3111 
In terms of its inherent jurisdiction, which is rarely 
exercised for such purposes. See Castellow v Sqmerset 
























Similar procedures are available in Canada for obtaining 
pre-trial judgment or pre-trial dismissal of a plaintiff's claim 
where, for example, a plaintiff or defendant lacks a valid claim 
or defence 30s or where one of the parties has failed to take a 
prescribed procedural step. 306 
(e) south Africa 
As has been the case in their approach to applications for 
summary judgment, the South African courts have been circumspect 
in exercising their punitive powers of dismissal and striking 
out. The rules of court themselves also provide a number of 
procedural safeguards - not only to the litigant who faces a 
possible dismissal of his or her action or striking out of their 
defence, but also to the litigant who has been placed under "bar" 
or who has had default judgment entered into against him or her. 
In the case of the former category of litigants, each rule which 
grants the court the punitive powers set out above either 
expressly, or by necessary implication, allows for adequate 
notice and warning of the possible consequences of default by 




See, for example, Rules of Practice. supreme Court of 
Ontario R R O 1960, Reg 396 '(as amended), Rule 126. 
See further Rules 56 to 65 
See Rules 36 to 42 of the aforementioned Rules of 
Court 
For example URC Rule 26, requires a party wishing to 
place another party under "bar" for failing to file a 
pleading to give the allegedly delinquent party at 
least five court days to do so; a party seeking 
dismissal of another party's action (or striking out 
of his/her defence, as the case may be) for failling 
to remedy an irregular step must, in terms or URC Rule 
30(5), give the other party at least ten court days' 
notice. It would furthermore seem that the court 























category of litigants, the rules make provision for applications 
to be launched for the removal of bar308 and for rescision of 
judgment. 309 For this second category of litigants, however, an 
affidavit must be included in their application setting out "good 
cause". Typically, South African courts will generally deem "good 
cause" to be present (and grant an application to remove the bar 
or to rescind the default judgment, as the case may be) where the 
applicant has provided a reasonable explanation for his or her 
default; has brought the application bona fide; has not 
recklessly or intentionally disregarded the rules of court; has 
shown that he or she has a defence which is good in law and which 
is not obviously without foundation, and (in the case of an 
application for the removal of bar) has also shown that the other 
party will not be prejudiced to the extent that any prejudice 
cannot be rectified by a suitable order as to costs. 310 
Though the provisions in the rules of court which grant the 
courts the powers mentioned above can, theoretically, restrict 
a litigant's right of access to court they are essential to 
ensure fair and proper adjudication of disputes. These rules 
furthermore serve to protect bona fide litigants with real claims 
and defences from being held to ransom by the tyranny of mala 
fide litigants and those litigants who have wanton disregard for 
the rights of others - and this would also seem to be the 
position in those countries mentioned above. It is, accordingly, 




the rules first and only if he/she fails to comply 
does it invoke its punitive powers (see, for example, 
Herbstein and van Winsen (supra) @ 612 and the wording 
of URC 35 (7)) 
See, for example, URC 27 
See, for example, URC 31(2) (b) 
See generally Herbstein and van Winsen (supra) @ 554 -























of their existence, per se, would succeed. In addition, there can 
be no question that the safeguards provided by the rules 
themselves, and the tests employed in their interpretation by the 
courts, themselves provide more than adequate protection to all 
litigant$. Should the courts fail to observe such tests, their 
decisions will continue to be set aside on appeal. 
3.5 Extinctive prescription 
"Rules that limit the time during which litigation may 
be launched are common in our legal system as well as 
many others. Inordinate delays in litigating damage 
the interests of justice. They protract the disputes 
over the rights and obligations sought to be enforced, 
prolonging the uncertainty of all concerned about 
their affairs. Nor in the end is it always possible to 
adjudicate satisfactorily on cases that have gone 
stale. By then witnesses may no longer be available to 
testify. The memories of one whose testimony can be 
obtained may have faded and become unreliable. 
Documentary evidence may have disappeared. Such rules 
prevent procrastination and those harmful consequences 
of it. They thus serve a purpose to which no exception 
in principle can cogently be taken. " 311 
To what extent (if at all) are provisions limiting the time 
period for instituting legal aGtion unconstitutional? In 
answering this question the position in those two foreign 
jurisdictions_with constitutionally-entrenched access to court 
provisions, namely the United States and the European Community, 
will be considered. 























(a) The United States 
In the United States legislation which makes provision for 
extinctive prescription (more commonly known there as statutes 
of limitation) is always the prerogative of the legislature. 312 
It has, however, been held that the legislature does not have the 
power to "cut off" an existing remedy entirely as this would 
amount to an outright denial of justice. 313 It has also been held 
that a legislature does not have the power to interfere with 
vested rights of action after a suit has begun. 314 A statute may, 
however, change the remedies which a party has to enforce his/her 
rights provided that it does not at the same time impair the 
obligation of contract. 315 Because of the general view that a 
statute of limitations "acts only on the remedy and does not 
extinguish the subs tan ti ve right", 316 a provision limiting an 
action does not ordinarily impair the obligation of contract if 
a "reasonable time" is allowed for the enforcement of the 
cause (s) of action. 317 As can be seen from the above, statutes of 
limitation which do not destroy vested rights or impair the 
obligation of contract are generally permissible in the United 
States provided the period of limitation is reasonable. In other 







See 51 Am Jur 2d at pg. 611 
See idem at pg. 613 and the authorities cited infra 
footnote 16 
Loe cit and Shaurette v Capitol Erecting co. 23 Wis 2d 
538, 128 NW2d 34 

























before the bar becomes effective. 318 In the United States the 
courts have the right to review the reasonableness of the period 
of limitation. 319 In considering the reasonableness of the period 
of limitation they are bound to consider the circumstances to 
which the statute applies, but will not hold the limitation 
provision invalid unless the period is so short as to amount to 
a "practical denial of the right itself. " 320 Each case must, of 
course, be separately judged in relation to its own unique 
circumstances. 321 There is no "hard and fast rule" which can be 
set down. 322 A sub-test which would appear to have developed is 
that a relatively short period may be reasonable in circumstances 
where "prompt action" is desirable. 323 
(b) The European Community 
Though no European Court case law on the subject could be 
found, it has been suggested by Sieghart, 324 that as is the case 
with immunity, prescription (like immunity) may well be 
acceptable grounds for a court not pronouncing on a claim. The 
fact that the European Covenant expressly requires the hearing 








See idem at pg. 615 
See idem at pg. 616 and the cases Sohn v Waterson, 17 
Wall (US) 596, 21 L Ed 737 
Idem op Joe cit 
Idem@ 617 
Idem@ 618 at§ 35, where the authors give a number of 
examples - including that in certain circumstances a 
period of 3 months has been held to be insufficient, 
while in others a period of 30 days has been held to 
be reasonable. 
See idem op loc cit and GilfiJ.lan v !Jnion Canal co .. 
109 US 401, 27 L Ed 977, 3 S Ct 304 























to support a contention that a reasonable time limit for the 
enforcement of a claim is a justifiable limitation on the right 
of access to court since it protects the defendant's right not 
to be suddenly confronted with an ancient claim but to be brought 
to court and "tried" within a reasonable time of the cause of 
action having arisen. 
(c) south Africa 
The question of extinctive prescription was raised before 
South Africa's Constitutional Court in Mohloroi v.: Minister of 
Defence, 325 where section 113 (1) of the Defence Act326 came under 
judicial scrutiny. The section effectively barred civil actions 
relating to things done by members of the Defence Force in the 
course and scope of their duties if legal action was not 
instituted within six months of the cause of such action having 
arisen .filld if_ notice of such intended action was not given at 
least one month before its institution to the Minister of 
Defence. In holding the provisions of section 113(1) to 
constitute not only an infringement, but also an unreasonable and 
unjustifiable limitation, of the right of access to court327 , 
Didcott J gave some indication as to how courts interpreting the 
access to court provision might go about deciding its 
applicability (or non-applicability) in any given instance. 
In considering whether, in the first instance, there was an 
infringement of the access to court provision, and having 
accepted that extinctive prescription served "a purpose to which 





1996 (12) BCLR 1559 (CC) 
Act 44 of 1957 
Thens 22 of the 1993 Constitution 






















held that not .all time limits taken to achieve the result 
mentioned above were neccessarily sound and that whether there 
was an infringement of the right of access to court per se 
depended upon "the sufficiency or insufficiency, the adequacy or 
inadequacy, of the room which the limitation leaves open in the 
beginning for the exe.tcise of the right. " 329 He held that chapter 
III of the Prescription Act~_,n was "a handy yardstick"111 against 
which to measure section 113(1) and that section 113{1) "differed 
markedly and materially"33~ from chapter III of the said Act rn 
The court held that many of the claimants who are hit by section 
113(1} ~are not afforded an adequate and fair opportunity to seek 
judicial redress for wrongs allegedly done to them." They are, 
particularly due to factors such as poverty and illiteracy, "left 
with too short a time within which to give the requisite 
notices •.. and to sue. "334 For these reasons, the court held that 
s 113(1) .did infringe the right of access to court. 
The court then turned to consider whether, notwithstanding 
the very short time frame, it was justified by the general 









Act 68 of 1969 
@ 1565G 
@ 1566E 
Where the following time periods, inter alia, are 
provided: 30 ~ears for judgment debts, debts secured 
by mortgage bonds, taxation or debts in respect of 
mineral rights owed to the state (s ll(a)); 15 years 
for other debts owed to the state (s ll(b)); 6 years 
for debts on bills of exchange or negotiable 
instruments (s 11 (c}); 3 years for ordinary debts 
(including delicts) 
@ 1566H 














a reasonabie and justifiable limitation, Didcott J felt it not 
necessary to go any further than to compare section 113(1} with 
section 57 of the newly-enacted South African Police Service Act 
336 which, unlike its predecessor and section 113 ( 1) , not only 
provides twelve (as opposed to six) calendar months for the 
institution of actions against the police (from the date of the 
cause of action arising) but also grants the court the discretion 
to dispense with, inter alia, the said requirement "where the 
interests of justice so require. " 331 The "striking" contrasts 
between sections 113(1) and 57 were so great as to lead the 
Constitutional Court to conclude that section 113(1) could not 
be considered either reasonable or justifiable. 338 
4. conclusion 
Space does not permit consideration also to be given to the 
many other instances in the context of civil litigation where 
constitutional questions are raised. These instances include, for 
example, arrests tanquam suspectus de fuga and fundandam et 
I confirmandam jurisdictionem, 339 the incidence of onus in civil 
proceedings, 340 the admissibility {or non-admissibility} of 














Act 68 of 1995 
s 57(5) 
@ 1569C 
See Erasmus (supra) @ A2-18. For the infringement of 
possible procedural requirements see too Coetzee v 
Government of the Re:gublic of south Africa, Me,tiso and 
Others v commanding officer. Port Elizabeth Prison and 
Otbers 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) 
See Didcott J's judgment in Prinsloo v van Der Linde 
and Anotbet ( supra) 
























As has been seen from the above discussions some useful hints 
have been forthcoming from the Constitutional Court in the very 
few cases where the right of access to court has been considered 
by that forum per se. It would seem343 that in relation to 
measures which place a limit or restriction upon what would 
otherwise be an unlimited right to be heard by the court344 one 
approach, before even considering the question of the general 
limitation clause, is to see whether the measure concerned serves 
"a purpose to which no exception in principle can cogently be 
taken. " 315 According to this approach it is only once the measure 
is shown to amount to an effective denial of an "adequate and 
fair opportunity to seek judicial redress" 346 that the question 
of compliance (or non-compliance) with the requirements of the 
general limitation clause comes into play. At both stages of the 
enquiry, however, there can be no doubt that the situation in 
foreign jurisdictions is particularly useful in assisting the 






see Mthetwa and others v Diectericks and others 1996 
(7) BCLR 1012 (N) where Thirion J held rule 49(1) of 
the Magistrates' Courts Rules to be inconsistent with 
section 22 of the 1993 Constitution, to the extent to 
which it required an applicant for rescission of a 
default judgment to furnish security for the costs of 
the default judgment and those of the application for 
rescission. 
From the approach adopted in Mohlomi Y Minister of 
Defence (supra), for example 
Which include, it is submitted, summary judgment; the 
powers of dismissal of actions and striking out of 
defences; and extinctive prescription 
























On the other hand, 347 however, no clear tons ti tutional 
guidelines would, as yet, seem to have emerged in South Africa 
with regard to determining precisely what constitutes, from a 
constitutional point of view, "a fair public hearing" before a 
court, tribunal or other forum seized with determining non-
criminal legal disputes. 348 Whatever the case may be in regard 
to procedures which prima facie limit or restrict, one's right to 
be heard, as far as the element of the "fair hearing" itself is 
concerned, it is highly likely that in many (if not in most) 
instances where this element is considered, the common law, which 
provides a wealth of rights relating, for example, to the rules 
of natural justice and grounds of review will probably 
constitute the yardsticks against which any alleged infringement 
of the right to this "fair" hearing will be measured. In 
determining whether these yardsticks are too short, the position 
in foreign jurisdictions with similar constitutionally-entrenched 
rights will probably be- decisive. 
There can be no doubt that one of the clearest effects of 
section 34 349 was essentially to "eliminate" the ouster clauses 
of old. 350 Nonetheless, the effects of section 34 are far from 
limited to that apparent objective. If interpreted correctly and 
cautiously, the section could do much both to improve and 
safeguard the position of the civil litigant, for example, by 
affording the courts an opportunity to revisit and reconsider our 





With the possible exception of the obiter remarks 
quoted supra in the Besserglik case (supra) 
For example, in determining to what extent (if any) 
whether there is a right of appeal and of legal 
representation 
And its predecessor, s 22 of the 1993 Constitution 























procedure each time the section is invoked and, where necessary, 
to augment the common law where it is held insufficient for the 
protection of a litigant's constitutional rights. At the same 
time the section will continue to form part o.f a growing human 
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